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Current Trends in Cooperative Finance 
Introduction 
The cooperative business model has several unique aspects including the systems for distributing 
profits and the structure of owner’s equity.  In turn, cooperatives manage distinct financial issues not 
faced by investor owned firms.  Among U.S. agricultural cooperatives, including grain marketing and 
farm supply cooperatives, three recent trends have emerged.  First, cooperatives have recently made 
unprecedented reinvestments in infrastructure in responses to changes in their business environments.  
Next, cooperatives have also reformulated their strategies for profit distribution and equity creation.  
Finally, agricultural cooperatives have and are going through a period of rapid consolidation through 
mergers.  Because of the importance of U.S. agricultural cooperatives to producers and the overall 
agricultural economy, these trends are worthy of closer examination. 
Short Background on Cooperative Finance 
Cooperative firms distribute profits in proportion to member use, a system commonly referred to 
as patronage distributions.  This is in contrast to profit distribution in investor owned firms where profit 
distribution is based on ownership.  Patronage distributions eliminate any direct benefit of equity 
ownership and is therefore also responsible for the unique equity structures of cooperative firms.  
While there are minor variations in structure, many U.S. agricultural cooperatives follow this 
traditional cooperative structure.  According to Chaddad and Cook (2004), nearly all U.S. grain marketing 
and farm supply cooperatives, as well as most dairy and cotton cooperatives, are classified under this 
structure. These cooperatives are often described as open membership cooperatives because producers 
can join at any time.  To become a voting member and receive patronage from the cooperative, a producer 
has to make nominal investment in a cooperative’s non-tradeable membership share.  
Traditional open membership cooperatives create or accumulate the majority of their equity by 
retaining profits.  This is accomplished by retaining a portion of patronage refunds and issuing equity 
shares to members instead of cash patronage.  These equity shares are eventually redeemed by the 
cooperative, and are therefore referred to as revolving equity.  Cooperatives use a number of different 
strategies for redeeming equity including systems based on the year the stock was issued, the age of the 
patron, a percentage pool, and other criteria.  The average U.S. agricultural cooperative revolves equity on 
an 18-year basis (Eversull 2010).  In addition to this revolving equity, the cooperative may also retain 
profits from nonmember business and a portion of the profits from member business as unallocated equity 
(retaining earrings) which are typically never redeemed. It is worth noting that while there are agricultural 
cooperatives operating under different structures than these (e.g., pooling cooperatives, new generation 
cooperatives), the issues discussed in this paper do not apply to those structures.   
In a traditional open membership cooperative, the board of directors makes profit distribution 
decisions on an annual basis.  The first step, which is mandated by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, is 
to separate member-based profits from nonmember profits.  Cooperatives typically retain the after-tax 
portion of nonmember profits as unallocated equity that is not redeemed.  The board has a number of 
choices for retaining or distributing member-based profits.  The profits can be distributed to members in 
the form of cash patronage (redeemed in cash immediately) or as retained patronage which is redeemed 
for cash at a later date.  When a cooperative retains patronage, they distribute that portion of the profits in 
the form of equity certificates or equity credits.  The equity created through retained patronage is 
classified as allocated equity because it is designated to particular members.  
Cooperatives are allowed to exclude patronage distributions to members from their taxable 
income calculations.  Sub Chapter T of the U.S. tax code provides cooperatives this tax treatment because 
the cooperative operates as an extension of its members’ farms.  While cash patronage is excluded from 
taxable income in the year it is distributed, a cooperative has two choices in issuing retained patronage.  It 
can issue qualified allocated equity which is excluded from taxable income in the year it is distributed.  
The other choice is to issue nonqualified allocated equity which is excluded from taxable income in the 
year it is redeemed for cash.  In either case, the tax liability is ultimately passed through to the member.  
Thus, the choice of qualified or nonqualified retained patronage impacts the timing of the taxation and has 
cash flow implications for both the cooperative and member.   
Historically, most U.S. agricultural cooperatives have distributed retained patronage in the form 
of qualified allocated equity.  The reason for primarily issuing qualified allocated equity was because 
farmers typically were subject to a lower tax rate than the cooperative.  Before the 1980s, individual tax 
rates were substantially lower than corporate tax rates.  As a result, farmers paid less tax on qualified 
distributions than the cooperative would pay on nonqualified distributions.  Given farmers are the owners 
of the cooperative, it was to their overall benefit for them to immediately pay taxes on the profits at their 
tax rate rather than “park the taxation” in the cooperative at a higher rate.  Today, effective corporate tax 
rates and individual tax rates are nearly the same.  Farmers and cooperatives do not have the same clear-
cut decision to only issue qualified allocated equity.  In many cases, grain marketing and farm supply 
cooperatives are beginning to issue nonqualified allocated equity to their farmer-owners (Kenkel, Barton 
and Boland, 2014) 
Recent Investment Trends in Grain Marketing and Farm Supply Cooperatives 
In recent years, grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives have made unprecedented 
investments to construct new assets and replace existing assets for handling grain and oilseeds, crop 
nutrients, chemicals, energy, and agronomic services. In some cases this is a result of past decisions by 
cooperative boards of directors to delay reinvesting in infrastructure due to competing needs for cash for 
cash patronage and equity redemption programs.  Basnet and Kenkel (2014) analyzed grain handling 
infrastructure in Oklahoma and determined that 74% of the steel structures and 91% of the concrete 
structures were beyond their design lifespan.  The authors estimated that grain handlers (both cooperative 
and private) needed to invest $270M to replace obsolete structures. 
Risch et al. (2014) describe the changes in cropping patterns, farming practices, and crop yields 
which have necessitated these investments which led to increased supply and greater volumes of grain 
and oilseeds being handled by marketing cooperatives. These increases have placed stress on facilities 
which were not designed for the current throughput. Boland (2012) documented the net capital investment 
(the amount by which capital expenditures exceed depreciation) has been dramatically increasing for 
grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives. Net capital investment provides a measure of the increase 
in productive capacity of the firm. These investments have totaled billions of dollars in grain and oilseed 
storage, crop nutrient and chemical storage, application equipment, and similar assets.   It is evident that 
many cooperatives are responding to member’s needs for “speed and space”. 
An agricultural cooperative can also be thought of as an extension of the farm firm, facilitating 
scale economies in input acquisition and marketing.  The decision to invest in cooperative infrastructure 
can also be viewed as an allocation of resources between the cooperatives and their producer members. 
Russell and Briggeman (2014) analyzed the cooperative’s decision to distribute cash patronage or retain 
funds using a two period portfolio model.  Because of the complexities of modeling revolving equity, the 
authors limited the decisions to issuing cash patronage or retaining funds as unallocated equity.  They did 
not include the more common practice of retaining funds as allocated revolving equity.  Historical data 
from the Kansas Farm Management Association and CoBank were used to model the return on assets 
(ROA) and effective cash rates for Kansas grain and farm supply cooperatives and Kansas farm 
operations.  Based on those historical data series, the average ROA of the cooperatives was higher than 
that of farm firms (8.5% versus 3.6%).  The cooperatives also had lower effective tax rates (9.4% versus 
14.1%) and the variance of the cooperative’s ROA was less than that of the farm ROAs.  The results 
indicated that the optimal profit distribution allocation was to distribute a small portion of profits to 
members as cash patronage (10%) and retain the remainder for investment in the cooperative firm. 
The insights from Russell and Briggeman’s (2014) portfolio model are consistent with the 
previous discussion on the need for speed and space.  Historically, grain producers have utilized on-farm 
grain storage and producer-owned application equipment as well as participating in those services through 
agricultural cooperatives.  As grain yields have increased, along with average farm size, producers were 
faced with decisions to upgrade farm level investments or increase the use of grain handling and 
application services through their cooperatives. On net, producers decided to source those services 
through their cooperatives.  In the December 1999 USDA position report, 66% of the U.S. corn stocks 
were stored in on-farm storage.  By 2015 that level had fallen to 45% (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
NASS).  Producers’ collective decision to store a greater portion of grain in their cooperatives, coupled 
with the increasing grain yields, contributed to the higher ROAs of cooperative firms.  Those ROAs 
encouraged cooperative boards to invest in infrastructure. 
Profit Distribution Reformulation by Cooperative Boards of Directors  
The increased net investment by agricultural cooperatives created a parallel need for increased 
equity.  That contributed to a second trend: reformulation of strategies for profit distribution and 
management of revolving equity.  As discussed, the cooperative board has three options for increasing 
equity.  They can retain the after-tax portion of profits as unallocated reserves.   Alternatively they can 
retain the after-tax portion of profits as nonqualified allocated equity, an action which creates a future 
redemption obligation as well as a future tax deduction. Finally, the cooperative can retain a higher 
portion of funds as qualified allocated equity.  Qualified allocations allow them to immediately exclude 
the distribution from taxable income but it also creates a future equity redemption obligation.   Retaining 
funds as qualified allocated equity creates taxable income for the member.  Under Sub Chapter T, a 
cooperative must pay at 20% of entire patronage allocation in cash in order for the retained portion to be 
treated as a qualified distribution.  In practice, most cooperatives pay a higher portion of cash so that the 
producer will have sufficient cash to pay the associated tax obligations.  
Impact of the Domestic Production Activities Deduction 
As discussed, cooperatives are typically able to retain only the after-tax portion of profits which 
are channeled to unallocated equity or nonqualified allocated equity since the cooperative is not able to 
deduct profits channeled to those choices. However, since 2004 U.S. marketing cooperatives have been 
able to use a deduction against patronage income (analogous to a tax credit) called the Domestic 
Production Activities Deduction (DPAD)  This allowed them to retain profits as unallocated equity 
without the associated increase in tax liability (Kenkel, Barton, and Boland, 2014). The DPAD also 
increased the attractiveness of retaining profits as allocated nonqualified equity but some cooperatives 
were reluctant to engage in the communication campaign to explain the new class of equity to their 
members.  
In recent years, grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives have employed multiple strategies 
to generate the equity and cash flow required for infrastructure investment. The overall tendency has been 
toward retaining a greater portion of both local profits and distributions from regional cooperatives as 
unallocated equity. Boland (2012) presented data from 441 farm supply and grain / oilseed marketing 
cooperatives. Figure 1 illustrates a fairly dramatic increase in the ratio of unallocated equity to total 
equity.   A number of factors likely contributed to this shift.  The availability of the DPAD allowed 
cooperatives to retain profits as unallocated equity without increasing their tax liability.   
Many cooperative members are unenthusiastic about receiving patronage in the form of qualified 
allocated equity due to the tax effects.  In some cases, depending on the cash patronage percentage and 
the member’s tax rate, the patronage distribution can even be cash flow negative.  Additionally, while 
cooperative members must receive written notice for allocations of cash, qualified equity and 
nonqualified equity patronage, information on retention as unallocated income is available only in the 
audit or in the financial report at the annual meeting.  Some cooperative boards may determine that 
retaining funds as unallocated equity is less controversial.  Many boards are also concerned about future 
equity redemption obligations and/or want to reduce equity revolving periods.  Retaining more funds as 
unallocated equity does allow the cooperative to revolve the allocated equity more rapidly.  
Impact of Profit Distribution Strategies on the Cooperative Members’ Return 
Kenkel (2015) considered the question of how profit allocation impacted the member’s rate of 
return from the cooperative.  The study used a time series of financial data from 10 case study and a 
financial simulation program to create a 30 year set of pro-forma financial statements for each 
cooperative.  The simulations set the asset growth and reinvestment to be consistent with each 
cooperative’s historical average and modeled the existing equity redemption system.  The study examined 
profit distribution strategies that involved retained funds as unallocated equity, qualified allocated equity 
and nonqualified allocated equity.  The cash patronage rates were adjusted so that each strategy generated 
the same cash flow to the cooperative.  The members’ internal rate of return from the cooperative (cash 
patronage plus eventual equity redemption) was calculated with and without the assumption that the 
cooperative took advantage of the DPAD.  The tax rates for the cooperative and member were consistent 
with the levels determined by Russell and Briggeman (2014). 
The results, which are shown in Figure 2, indicated that retaining funds as nonqualified allocated 
equity maximized the members IRR with and without the DPAD.   If the cooperative did not use the 
DPAD retaining funds as unallocated equity (the apparent choice by cooperative boards) yielded the 
lowest member return.  If the cooperative used the DPAD retaining funds as unallocated equity yielded a 
lower member IRR relative to retaining as nonqualified allocated equity but was slightly superior to 
retaining profits as qualified equity.  
When cooperatives take advantages of the DPAD they can shift from retaining funds as qualified 
equity to unallocated equity without reducing cash patronage and still maintain the same cash flow.  If the 
cooperative has a low cash patronage rate and long revolving period (as was the case in some of the case 
study firms) the member’s IRR is actually improved by not receiving the tax obligation of the qualified 
equity distribution even though they give up a redemption payment in a future period.  Retaining profits 
as nonqualified equity was still a better choice since it had the same tax effect on the member in the 
distribution year and led to an eventual cash flow from equity redemption. These results suggest that 
cooperative boards of directors may need more education to understand their profit distribution choices 
and the impacts on the members. 
Consolidation of Agricultural Cooperatives 
A final notable trend is the increase in mergers of local grain marketing and farm supply 
cooperatives (Eversull, 2014).  Periods of increased consolidation across the agricultural retail sector were 
experienced throughout the 1980s and 1990s; however, the current activity appears to be less cyclical and 
motivated by somewhat different factors.  While this trend is undoubtedly interrelated with both increased 
net capital asset investments and shifting profit allocation strategies, human capital factors are playing an 
increasing role.   
Historically strategic growth and financial hardships have been the key drivers to consolidation 
activity in retail agriculture.  Jacobs (2016) documents the change in Iowa cooperatives from 1980 – 
2015, illustrated in figures 3 and 4.  The change in the number of Iowa cooperatives is representative of 
the grain and farm supply cooperative sector.  During the mid-1980s to mid-1990s time period 
cooperative consolidation occurred in cycles when financially stressed cooperatives merged with other 
cooperatives or were purchased by private firms. Since the late 1990s, consolidations between 
cooperatives has been more consistent. The outcome of the consolidation activity since 1980 has been 
fewer cooperatives, but not fewer locations to serve members. Figure 4 shows, for Iowa, the number of 
cooperatives and total locations over the period 1979 – 2015.  Consolidation between cooperatives has not 
resulted in a significant drop in the number of locations being managed.   
Economies of scale and scope and improvement in equity structures have been the historical 
driving force of cooperative consolidation.  As cooperative firms explore reinvestment in grain storage 
and crop nutrient handling, it is natural to consider alliances that can accommodate larger-scale regional 
facilities (McKee, Wilson and Dahl, 2015).   The development of jointly owned assets is often a stepping 
stone to the exploration of unification of the two firms.  In other cases, cooperatives consider a merger as 
direct path to develop a larger scale regionally located facility.   Cooperative unification can also be 
perceived by members of a smaller cooperative as a pathway to more rapid equity redemption. The length 
of the equity revolving period is closely linked to profitability.  Larger cooperatives tend to achieve scale 
economies that generate higher profitability and allow them to revolve allocated equity more rapidly.  The 
possibility of more rapid equity redemption can make a merger opportunity attractive to a smaller 
cooperative’s membership. 
Human resource issues are a more recent factor contributing to cooperative mergers.  Froelich, 
McKee and Rathge (2011) investigated succession planning in cooperative and non-profit firms.  Of the 
almost 250 firms responding he found that 28% anticipated CEO retirement within 4 years, 64% within 9 
years.  As a cooperative CEO approach retirement the board often considers whether it might be easier to 
merge than to identify, recruit and hire the needed level of management talent.  McKee and Froelich 
(2016) also found that boards faced with CEO succession prefer candidates from their same business 
sector (cooperative firms prefer managers with cooperative management experience) and that they limited 
their search to a regional scope.  Because of these tendencies, cooperative boards often find themselves 
trying to recruit management talent from a small pool and are competing with neighboring cooperatives.  
Smaller cooperatives have somewhat different management resource issues.  As the CEOs of 
these firms gain experience they are often recruited to manage larger cooperatives.  Smaller, single 
location cooperatives are often unable to afford the caliber of mid-level management that can be 
developed into a CEO.  That generates a continuing series of disruptive CEO successions that leads the 
board to explore unification with another cooperative to achieve a firm size that will attract and maintain 
a quality CEO.   
Conclusions 
Grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives are an important component of the U.S. 
agricultural cooperative sector and an integral part of U.S. grain production.  In recent years these 
member owned firms have rapidly grown their asset base, consolidating with other cooperatives and 
shifting to a structure of more permanent equity capital and less revolving equity.  All of these changes 
have been driven by needs to adapt to a changing industry environment and customer base.  These 
changes have also added to the complexity of leading a cooperative.  Cooperative boards of directors and 
senior management teams need a level of financial literacy and business acumen that far exceed historical 
levels of knowledge.  The agricultural economics and agricultural finance professions have the 
opportunity to assist cooperatives by further investigating these trends, and developing applied research 
that can be disseminated to cooperative directors, managers, and employees. 
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 Figure 1: Unallocated equity as a percentage of total equity for local farm supply and grain and oilseed 
marketing cooperatives, 1996 to 2010 
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Figure 2. Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) Impact on 
Cooperative Members’ Internal Rate of Return 
  
 
Figure 3.  Annual Percent Change in Number of Iowa Cooperatives 
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Figure 4. Total Iowa Cooperatives and Locations, 1979 – 2015 
 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Total Number of Cooperatives Total Number of Locations
